TLS 1.3 Handshake

RFC 8446 Deep Dive

ECDHE key exchange, AEAD encrypted certificates, 0-RTT PSK resumption & downgrade sentinel protection

Step 1 of 16

Speed

Client (Browser)

TLS 1.3 Initiator

UNSECURE

ECDHE Key Share & Nonce

Cipher: Plaintext HTTP

Nonce: none

Priv / Pub: none

HKDF Key Schedule & Auth

HS Secret: none

App Traffic Key: none

Cert / MAC: unverified

0-RTT Ticket: none

Channel Confidentiality 0% (Cleartext)

Eavesdropper (ISP/Wi-Fi)

Wiretap / MITM Attacker

SNIFFING

Captured Wire Frames Cleartext Visible

GET /login HTTP/1.1

200 OK (HTML)

Secret Recovery: Reading Plaintext

Server (example.com)

TLS 1.3 Origin Endpoint

UNSECURE

ECDHE Key Share & Nonce

Selected Suite: Plaintext HTTP

Server Nonce: none

Priv / Pub: none

Identity Proof & Traffic Key

HS Secret: none

App Traffic Key: none

CertVerify Sig: idle

PSK Ticket: none

Transcript MAC: Awaiting Handshake

STEP 1 OF 16 PLAINTEXT RISK

1. The Insecure Web (Plaintext)

Without TLS, communication happens in plaintext over HTTP. Any router, ISP, or eavesdropper on the network path can effortlessly read and capture sensitive data.

Component Inspector

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Client (Browser)

TLS 1.3 Client with Ephemeral ECDHE & 0-RTT PSK Cache

What This Component Is Doing Now

Transmitting plaintext HTTP requests that are immediately intercepted by the passive network eavesdropper.

Why This Component Matters

Generates fresh ephemeral private keys per connection for Forward Secrecy and validates server CertificateVerify signatures and downgrade sentinels.

Interactive Runtime Config

READY · 2ms

How This Component Works With The Rest Of The System

Sends ClientHello + KeyShare to the Server across the untrusted network while preventing the Eavesdropper from computing the shared secret.